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2. In 19.57, Myra Haskins became estranged from her husband, Boaz Haskins. She was th(
owner of a tract of land, and on March 7, 19.58, she entered into a written contract
with Johnston Beckett, whereby she agreed to sell the tract to Beckett for an agreed
consideration. The contract provided that on or before August 31,19.58, Myra Haskins
would execute and deliver to Beckett a deed with general warr~nty, si~ned by her
"and all other necessary parties" and conveying the property ~n fee s :unple, and
concluded with this paragrapht
nd
rees that if her husband cannot be found, or
"The vendor hereby c?nvenan s a
ag d d she will institllte and conduct at her
if found, refuses to s~gn the necess~ry ee ,

own expense, such suit or suits as may be necessary to deliver a clear and unencumbered title to the above described property to the purchaser."
Boaz Haskin's whereabouts were unknown at the time the contract was executed and
he did not execute it.
In July, 1958, Myra Haskins and Boaz Haskins became reconciled and resumed matrimonial relations, and on August 17, 19.58, Myra Haskins wrote to Beckett to the
effect that they would not execute the deed.
Beckett consults you as to his right to recover damages against Myra Haskins for
breach of contract.
How would you advise him?
(CONTRACTS) He has no right to recover damages for the contract was against public
policy, since,(reading between the lines), it seems obvious that Myra has agreed to
get a divorce from her husband in order to pass a merchantable title. See 193 Va.
162 on p.720(Contracts) of these Notes.

•

2. Smith~as ~~ged in a suit to set aside as fraudulent a deed made by Brown to
White. He received information that White had written a letter to Green admitting
that the deed was a mere sham, and in reliance thereon, Smith offered to pay Green
$100 for the letter. Green, not knowing the purpose for which the letter was desired, accepted the offer and mailed the letter to Smith. Instead of admitting the
fraud, the letter stated that the transaction was legitimate. Smith consults you
as to whether he is ., i bl to
~
4U ~
(CONTRACTS) I
- a e
Green for the ~1?0· What would you advise him?
h b
.
would advise Smith that he was hable to Green. Smith got the lett e~·
e arga~ned for. There was a detriment to the promisee Green in that he
~
a _letter
was legally entitled to keep. It is immaterlal that Smith did n~ave up
tb~ benef1.t he expected. See Illustration 2 of #81 Restatement of Contracts.t get

?e

3. Hercl~nt -:s~1id to Clerk: "I would like for you work in my store, and if you will
do so I will pay you $100 a week starting Monday." Clerk s aid: "I will take you up
and be there Monday." Clerk gave up his existing job and began work for Merchant
on Monday, but at the end of amonth, Merchant told him he would no longer be needed.
May Clerk recover damages from Merchant, assuming Clerk can't secure other employ·~
ment?
(CONTRACTS) No. This was an employment at will at the rate of $100 a week, or, at
most a contract by the week. If it was the latter the employer was not privileged
to discharge Clerk without cause in the middle of the week but could do so at the
end of any week with or without notice, and Clerk would be equally free to quit at
the end of any week. See Illustration 2 of #32, Restatement of Contracts.
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3. Constructors, Inc., is a general contracting firm and on June 8, 19.58, it con-

tracted to build a warehouse for Virginia Food Co. Masoneers, Inc., was engaged in
stone masonry work, and had submitted its bid to constructors Inc. for performing
'
'
'
the stone work on the building in the following
letter:
11 May 17,1958
"Constructors, Inc.
Waynesboro,Va.
Gentlemen:
We will. furnish ready cut to set all Indiana limestone required in
the erection of the proposed new Virginia Food Co. building at Greenville
Va. as per plans and specifications prepared and submitted by the super- '
vising architect,for the sum of $23,000 F.o.B. shipping point, freight
allowed to Staunton,Va.
We will also do all hauling, setting, cleaning and pointing of same
for the sum of $10,000.
Yours very truly,
Masoneers, Inc."
Upon receipt of this letter, Constructors,Inc., replied as follows by letter:
11 May 23, 19.58
·
ttMasoneers, Inc.
Harrisonburg, Va.

Gentlemen:
Regarding your letter of May 17,19.58, we hereby accept your estimate
amounting to $10,000 to perform the following work according to the plans'
and specification.J in connection with the Virginia Food Co. building.
c,
.vbo
All necessary limestone as per plans and specifications will be
furnished by us F.O.B. cars Staunton~ Va. and all granite stone to be delivered at the building site, you are to do all the hauling of limestone,
and the setting, cleaning, pointing and finishing complete all lime and
granite stone work.
As soon as the contract is awarded to us we will enter into contract
with you, in a more detailed form, for the prosecution of the work.
Yours truly,
Constructors, Inc •11
Masoneers returned a copy of the letter to Constructors,Inc., at the bottom of
whi ch·was written by Masoneers,Inc.:
11
We hereby agree fully to the terms and conditions as set forth above,
and accordingly affix our signature.
Masoneers,Inc.n
On June 19,1958, after Constructors, Inc., had been awarded the general contract,
Constructors advised Masoneers,Inc., that the job was going to be more costly than
Constructors had anticipated, that some costs could be saved by Constructors if the
stone work and foundation work were performed by the same sub-contractor, and that
unless Masoneers could perform both stone and foundation work, Constructors woul.d
be compelled to find another sub-contractor who could.
Did the correspondence between these parties constitute a binding contract
between thern?
(CONTRACTS) The question involved is whether or not the parties have agreed on all
the essenti al terms and meant the writings to be only a memorandum of that agreement
It is a matter of intention. In this case they have agreed. The formal contract
mentioned could not change the matters already agreed upon. So held in 154 Va.203.
(Or start off as above and then argue that both parties intended a more detailed
contract that up to the time of signing such a contract everything is inoperative
prelimin~ry negotiati on, and that . no mention is made of such facts as (a~are only
union men to be employed?(b)when LS the work to be started and completed.{c)Is there
, to be a provision about liquidated damages?(d)When is plaintiff to be paid?(e)What
type of bond, if any, is to be required?)
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4. Miller contracted to sell Wholesaler 1000 bags of Number One Patent Flour to be
delivered July 1,1959, at $3.00 per bag. Due to a mechanical breakdown Miller wa ~
unable to deliver the flour and Wholesaler bought it on the open market for $2.90..,
per bag. Wholesaler asks you the extent of his rights, if any, against Miller.
What should you advise him?
(CON~CTS) Since the contract has been broken Wholesaler does have a cause of act i.::.
but s~nce Wholesaler has not suffered actual damage he can only recover nominal
damages. He had best forget it. See Section 328, Restatement of Contracts •

. Q.4 on P~48l(~al~s). Since Wholesaler elected to ttcovern, i.e. secure similar gooc' ·
1n good fa~th w1th~n a reasonable time, any expenses saved as a result of s eller s
~r e ach m11st be deducted from the damages.
Hence he can recover nothing. See U.c .c.
#2- 712(2). Note: The u.c.c. does not contain any provisions with reference to the
recovery of nominal damages only. Perhaps such damages can still be recovered in a
proper case under general principles of contract law.

·- Lilly
c, o White Mills, Inc., entered into a contract with the Norfolk Super Market to
2~
deliver on October 1,1959, a carload of its "Lillywhite•• Flour to be manufactured by
Lilly White Mills,Inc., in Danville,Virginia, and de~ivered at No~~olk. The onl~
transportation service between Danville and Norfolk 1s the X&Y Ra1lro~d, and th1s
fact was known to both parties. By the terms of the sales contract, t1me was of the
essence. Due to strikes of employees in September, 1959, the X&Y Railroad declared
an embargo and refused to receive the flour from Lilly White Mills,Inc., when
seasonably tendered for shipment and co~tinu~d ~o to refuse until November 18,1959.
Lilly White Mills consults you as to 1ts l1ab~lity to the Norfolk Super Market.
What would you advise?
.
(CONTRACTS) I would advise that tl1ere was no liability. By hyp~the~is ther~ 7s no
other method of transportation. The contract was subject t~ an 1mplied condit1on
to the effect that if the only method of transportation · falled to function, then
Lilly White Mills would be excused from doing the impossible. See Restatement of
Contracts #461.
·yG o
). Clover Drugs,Inc., sent the usual monthly order to the Johnnyup Co. for 250
bottles of vitamin pills. Johnnyup Co. received the order, but being sold up to
capacity and unable to fill the order, requested Easter Drug Co., a manufacturer of
similar vitamin pills, to fill the order to Clover Drugs. Clover Drugs was no~ notified of the assignment of the order to Easter. Easter propmptly shipped to Clover
Drugs the pills of the same quality and at the same price as those usually sent by
Johnnyup Co. Clover Drugs refused to accept the pills shipped by Easter Drug Co.
Easter Drug Co. consults you as to its rights against Clover Drugs.
~1at would you advise?
(CONTRACTS) I would advise that it had no rights. An offer(order)given to Johnnyup
is not an offer to Easter. The offeror is entitled to determine with whom he will
deal. An offer is personal and, if it is an offer only, cannot be assigned. See
Restatement of Contracts #54 •

•
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Dec.29,1959, Sturm wrote the following letter to the C9pus Company:
nGentlemen:
ni have been doing vlell selling your exceU.ent Li.ne of Copus products in my
territoryo As you know, my present employment ends on Dec~3lst. I hope you
will"".empl.oy me again to handle this area for the year 1960.
"With best Christ1Tk1.a wishes, I am
·'
Cordially,
Oscar Stu:nn"
On Dec .. 30th, Irving Copus, the President and Sales Manager of the Copus Co., telephoned Sturm and informed him that he could con~ide~ himself employed for the year
1960~ However, on Jane2»1960, the Copus Co. notified Sturm that his services no
longer would be needed and dism-issed him as ito sal0sman, Stue'm haa brought an action
against the Copus Co. for breach of cont.t'act., M,3.Y he recover?
(CONTRACTS) No. The contract mt.l,de on December 30,1759 cannot be performed within
one year as Dec¥31,1960 is a year and a oay aftc~ Dec.30,19S9. Sime there is no
writing signed by the part y to ba charged he has the defense cf the statute of
frauds. See 87 Vao497o
3~ 0~

J f biandowner and Developer entered into a written contract bearing date March 1,1961,
by the terms of which Landowner agreed to sell and Developer agreed to purchase a
tract of land. The contract provided that the purchase price would be paid and the
deed delivered on May 1,1961. The contract contained the following provision:
"If the tract of land describe~ herein cannot be rezoned for use as a motel,this
contract is to be null and vo~d and there shall be no obligation upon the
parties hereunder."
Three days prior to May 1,1961, Developer .advised Landowner that he coQld not procure the rezoning of the area in which the property was located before the closing
dat e, and requested that he be given until Hay 15,196l,to enable him to procure a
r ezoning of the area. Landowner assented to this request and both parties signed an
endorsement on the written contract in the follnwing language:
"Developer is given until May 15,1961, to procure the rezoning of the area in
which the property is located."
·
Notwithstanding the endorsement on the contract, Landowner, having changed his mind:
advised Developer on May 2,1961, that as the purchase price had not been tendered and
the deed delivered by May 1,1961, the contract was no longer binding upon him and
that he intended to develop the property for his own purposes. On May 14,196l,the
area was rezoned to permit the construction of motels and, on May 15,196l,Developer
tendered the purchase price and demanded a deed for the property. Landowner refused,
whereupon Developer filed suit for specific performance. Landowner defended upon the
ground t hat the extension of the time for the performance of the contract was not
supported by consideration and that he was not thereby bound. Is this a valid defense?
(CONTRACTS) No. The consideration that supported the original contract equally
supports the contract as modified with the assent of each party. It is the same as
if the original contract had provided for May 15th. Or, it can be argued that Owner
waived an insubstantial portion of his rights, and in such a case no consideration
is needed for the waiver. See 196 Va.S26 in the Equity Cases of these Notes.

•
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Orbit entered into an oral contract with Ea~ybuck,Inc., a realty company.
By the terms of the agreement, Easybuck,Inc., was to develop,subdivide and sell
Orbit's tract of land at its own rocpense; Easybuck,Inc., was given three years to
complete the sale of the land; Easybuck,Inc., was to be reimbursed for its expenses
out of the first proceeds received from the sale of lots; after the expenses had been
repaid, Orbit was to receive from the sale of the lots $100,000; and all sums received from the sale of the lots in excess of $100,000, plus expenses, was to be
divided equally between Orbit and Easybuck,Inc. Within eighteen months from the
date of the agreement, Easybuck,Inc., had subdivided the land and sold one-half of
the lots, which produced sufficient funds to repay Easybuck,Inc.•s expenses and
$100,000 to Orbit. Shortly after receiving payment of $100,000, Orbit advised
Easybuck, Inc., tha.t he was terminating the contract. EMybuck, Inc., thereafter sued
Orbit to recover damages for breach of contract. Orbit filed a plea o-f the statute
of frauds, setting up (a) that the contract was fort he sale of an interest in real
estate, and(b)that the contract was not to be performed within one year. How should
the Court rule on each ground?
(CONTRACTS) The Court should rule against Orbit in each case. There is no contract
for the sale of land between these two parties but only an agency agreement. No title
to any realty passed as a result of this agreement. It is only when Easybuck sells
or contracts to sell the land as per power gi ven by the agency agreement that the
title to realty is affected. Since all the land might be sold within one year and
the agency contract fully performed within that one year, the agreement is not within that section of the statute of frauds relating to contracts that cannot be performed within a year .

•
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2. DG/he management of Clothing Stor e i_ n Abi ngdon read in an October , 1961, trade
journal that Suiters, Inc. , a manuf acturer of men 1 s clothing i n Bristol, was bringing out on December 1, 1961 , a ne-w fab r ic in men' s suits , and by l et t er Clothing
Store ordered from Suiters , Inc., 100 suit s t o be specially made up in the new f abric, at $50 per suit . Suiters r eplied promptl y, ac cepting t he order and promis ing
shipment on December 1. Early i n November, 1961, Clothing St ore found out about
another new fabric manufactured by a. compet itcr of Suiters and purchased 100 suits
from the competitor, advi sing Suiters by letter t o cancel its order. Suiters, by
return mai l, urged Clothi ng Store to r econsider its or der and insisted t hat Suiters'
f abric was of better qual i ty. Clothing Sto re made no r eply to thi s lett er.
One week later, having heard not hi ng f rom Clothing St ore , Suiters sold to Dimestore the suits it had made up f or Clothi ng Store , fo r $hO each , the best pri ce then
obtainabl e .
Clothing Store , f inding t hat the suits it had purchased f rom the competitor were
i n fac t inferior , tender ed t o Suiters on December 1, its check for $5,000 and demanded i mmediate shipment of the suit s i t had ori,gina11y order ed. Sui ters refused the
t ende r and, inst ead , institut ed an action against Clot hi ng Store fo r damages. Cloth·
i ng St ore filed i ts counterclaim against Suiters, al so seeking damages .
\<Jhich of the parti es is ent itled t o r e cover against the other?
(CONTRACTS) Sui ters i s ent i t l ed to collect . Clo t hi ng Store was guilty of an anticipat ory r epudiat i on ju sti ~[i ng Sui t er s i n changing hi s posit ion. By the better view
Suiters lo .st no right when he urged Clothing Sto r e t o abide by its agr eement . At
best thi s was merely a restatement of the original offer ~Jhich could be wit hdrawn
before ac ceptance and whi ch was open only for a r easonable time which under t he circumstances would have been a very short time. See Restatement Contracts §§ 319 and
320 and i llustration 1 after § 320 •
Q. 2' on Po543 (Contracts) The an3wer givm is consistent with u.c.c . /H/2··610 and
2..·611 on t he ef f ects of antici pat ory repudi at ion and retrac tion of t he repudi ation.

3.bGlndre11m was a sto~kholder in ABC Corp., a general contracting finn, which sought
a contract with Gunpowder Co. for the construction of Gunpovlder' s new plant in Covington. Gunpowder, after examining the financial statements of ABC Corp., was concerned about that firm's financial ability to carry out a construction job of the
magnitude contemplated. Andrews then entered into a written agreement with Gunpowde1
Co., to the effect that i f the construction contract were awarded to AB:: Corp. , Andrews would lend APC Corp. $25,000 for t1,vo years. The construction contract was
promptly awarded to ABC Corp.
After Andrews loaned AOC Corp. ;(; ) ,000, it cornmenced construction, but soon became
insolvent. ABC Corp. now informs you that Andrews has refused to lend it the remaining $20,000, and inquires whether, in an action brought by ABC Corp., Andrews may
be found obligated to make such loan.
Hmo1 should you advise A.EC Corp.?
(CONTRACTS) The primary purpose of Andrews' promise was to protect Gunpowder as the
latter had doubts about the ability of ABC Corp. to perform unless it had Andrews'
backing. Hence the ABC Corp. is only an i ncidental beneficiary and cannot recover
under the Code § S.S -22 since the contract was not made in whole or in part for the

•

.)LjL~.

!)Urpose of benefitting the ABC Corporation.
1

See 273 F. 2d 284 .

J01

Pargoe owned and operated a hardware store for many years in Radford , Virgi nia.
Hl'.l was approached in 1956 by a representative of Hoedown Co., a manufacturer of
~ arden rakes, and was requested to become the exclusive sales o~tlet for Hoedovm' s
ralces in western Virginia. It was orally agreed that Pargoe would sell the rakes
according to Hoedown's price list, that title to the rakes remained in Hoedown
until it had received payment for them, that Pargoe's orders would be p:romptly
shipped, but that Hoedown reserved the right to ship less than the amount ordered .
With this sole understanding, Pargoe ordered 200 rakes, which he promptly sold.
Thereafter, he continued for several years to re-order the rakes and to sell them,
and they were so popular that they became his principal item of sale. In 1961,
Hoedown wrote to Pargoe on his 5th anniversary as distributor of the rakes, thanking
Pargoe for his excellent record as distributor of the rakes and expressing the hope
that "the distributorship would be equally as successful d~lring the next five years.
On the strength of this, Pargoe, without Hoedown's knowledge, purchased for $3,000
a large neon sj_gn which proclaimed that he was the exclusive distributor of the
Hoedown rakes in western Vl.rginia.
One week after the sign was mounted on top of Pargoe's store, Hoedown notified
Pargoe that it would no longer ship rakes to Pargoe, that it had decided to open
its own store in Radford. Pargoe anticipates that the loss of the sales of rakes
will cause him a severe f i nancial reversal, and that the special neon sign will be
a total loss to him. He se~ks your advi ce aa to what claim for damages he may have
against Hoedown for its termination of the distributorship.
How would you advise
him?
(CONTRACTS) He had none. Pargoe was under no duty to buy any rakes nor was Hoedown
obliged to sell him any. The alleged contract is void for indefiniteness and for
being illusory. The hope that Pargoe would continue to do well in this matter is
not an offer and acceptance. There is merely a continuing offer revocable at any
time. Hoedown could not reasonably suppose that as a result of its letter, Pargoe
would purchase the sign so that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not applicable.
L+ .

•

•

_ft:. : r .

.

2" W1.nslow Peale, a noted a.r·t1.st, contracted to paint a portrait of Social Climber

•

which ttwould be sati~factory in every respect to you (Climber) and a work of art of
which you tV'ill be proud." The agreed price was $.3,00C. Peale completed the portrait
but Climber did not like it and so told Peale, and r efuse-:', t ·:) a.ccept the portrait.
Peale sued for the contract price . A !l'.lill.ber of outstanding po ~d-.rait painters testified that the portrait was a valuabl3 a1· t~.stic production and well worth the contract
price as an example of portraiture . Climber, in good faith, te8tified that he had
never liked the expression nor the. noloring an:i that he was not satisf:!.ad with the
portrait and did not want it. Thm·e was no eviden(: e contradicting this testimonye
How ought t he case to be decidee.?
(CONTRACTS) The ~ ase should be decidod fo r Climber., A condition of pe:c~eonal satisfaction wher~ matters of personal taste are invol'ved. i c valid provided Climber is
acting in good faith. He is the one to be satisfied, and i t i s immaterial that
others think the portrait an excellen ~ one.
3~~5fotb"a:t· on Monday wro·te Jvierchan+•.• nr offer you fo r prompt. ;.;.(~c eptanc~ one htmd't"ed
gross canned beans at eight cents per ~an. I also offer you ten gross canned peers
at twelve cents per can." Merchant knew he wanted the beans, but wished to check hi~
inventory before deciding about the pears; hence, he immediately telegraphed Jobber~
.(JCigt:: :;)~70

•

•

"Accept offer on beans letter follows on pears.•• Merchant checked hj.s inventory and
found that he did want the pears, so wrote Jobber accepting that offer~ This lettor
was posted at. 4:00p.m. the same Tuesday. At 5zOOp.m. that day and before the recei:p·:~.
of Merchant ~s telegram, Jobber posted a letter to Merchant reading' ~Offer to sell
beans and pears withdrawn." The price of each commodity having advanced substaniallJ .
r1erchant consults you as to his right, if any, to recover damages against Jobber
because of his refusal to deliver(a)the beans, and (b)the pears.
How ought you to advise him?
(CON1~CTS) I would advise that there was clearly a contract for the pears as of the
moment of tl1e posting of the letter of acceptance. Since this letter was posted before the letter of revocation was received, Jobber's offer was still open.
As to the beans I suggest one of the following ansvlers2
(a) Assuming that the telegram of acceptance reached Jobber before the letter of
revocation reached Merchant, there would be a valid contract, because, if one uses
an unauthorized method of communication it is not effective until received, and the
letter of revocation was also not effective until it was r eceived.
(b) Assuming that the telegram of acceptance reached Jobber after the letter of
revocation was received, there is no contract because the offer was withdrawn before
acceptance.
(c) Assuming there was a custom or course of dealing for offerees to accept offers
by mail by either letter or telegram, there would be a contract for the beans when
the telegram was sent.
Q. 3 on p.558(Contracts--Sales) Alternative ansl~r(c) finds support in the language of u.c.C.#2-206(l)(a) which is as follows: nunless otherwise unambiguously
indicated by the language; or circumstances an offer to make a contract shall be
construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the
circumstances."
.
2.YRobert Witherspoon conveyed Blackacre to his son, William, and requ~red in the
deed of conveyance the payment by William of :$10,000 in monthly installments of
$200 each to Robert's sister Mary, with the provision that should Mary die without
living issue, before all of the installments had been paid, then such further installments were not. to be paid .. A lien in Nary's favor was reserved to secure the
payment of this $10,000. After paying Mary $5,000 by regular monthly installments,
William desired to sell the land and agreed with Mary to give her his executed bo~,
1~ea.ding as follows:
j ) ' ;L..
"Thirty(30) days after date, I promise to pay Mary Witherspoon $5,000. 11
Mary accepted the bond and in return executed a release of the lien on the land •
Mary died without issue a month after accepting this bond and her Administrator
commenced an action against William Witherspoon for the f ull amount of the bond.
How much. i f anything, ought the Administrator to recover?
(CO NTRACTS) The Adminstrator should recover the whole $5,000. There has been a
mut ually agreed to modification of rights. Each did or promised to do something he
or she was not legally bound to do. The new contrar,t took the place of the prior
ar r angements and constitutes a novation. See 111 Va.240.

3 ~1Cn payment for a boat, Dexter executed two n0n-negotiable promissory notes due in
fJJ and 90 days, respectively, payable "to Ezra Stuart, 11 each in the amount of $1,000

at no interest. Upon receiving delivery of the boat from Stuart, Dexter gave these
notes to Stuart.
(1) By a separate writing, containing an adequate description of the first note,
Stuart assigned it to Baker, retained the note and handed the assignment to Baker.
~or this assignment Baker paid Stuart $900.
(2) On the second note Stuart wrote "pay to Carter,n signed the note and handed it
to Carter. For this assignment Carter paid Stuart $750. No one advised Dexter of
this assignment. Before the note was due, Dexter paid Stuart $500 to be applied on
this note. Stuart retained this money and did not tell Carter.
Only Baker notified Dexter of the assignment which he received .
As the notes became due, Baker and Carter each brought an action against Dexter
on the note he held. Each claimed $1 1 000.
To what extent, if any, should each recover?
(CONTRACTS) Baker can recover $1,000. He was an assignee for value of the first note.
It was not necessary for Stuart to actually turn over the assigned non-negotiable
note to Baker at least as between the pe.rties. It is immaterial that Baker only
paid $900 for the note as the sales price is a matter for Baker and Stuart to determine. There was no intention on their part to make a gift of $100 to Dexter. As to
Carter, he can recover only $.500 from Dexter. Unless notified to the contrary(in the
case of non-negotiable instruments) Dexter can assume that Stuart is still the
obligee and a payment to Stuart is valid. Of course Stuart is accountable to Carter
for the sum wrongfully kept by him. See 94 Va.370 and V#ll-6.

10~~~

June 16, 1958, Charles Edison employed James Morse to demonstrate and sell in
the City of Petersburg a nationally advertised "Brightlite" line of electrical
equipment of which he was the distributor. Morse soon developed an unusual talent
for this work and he and Edison entered into a written contract of employment for
five years, with the provision that if the employment was terminated for any cause,
Morse would not, for a period of two years thereafter, engage in the electrical
equipment business within a radius of five miles of Edison's store. Faraday, another employee of Edison's, in May, 1962; persuaded Morse, with full knowledge of
the provi~ions of Morse's contract, to quit work for Edison and go in partnership
with him in establishing their own electrical equipment business for the purpose of
selling another nationally advertised line known as 11 Sunshine$ 11 The new business,
which was also conducted in the City of Petersburg, has proven highly successful
and, due to the solicitation of Faraday, has taken away many of Edison's old customers because of their liking for Morse. .
Edison consults you as to whet9er h~- has a good cause of action for damages
against either Morse or Faraday, telling you that he can't show exactly how much
business he has lost, but that he can prove that he has lost at least six profitable customers. How ought you to advise him?
(CONTRACTS) Yes, Edison has a good cause of action against both--against Morse for
breach of contract--against Faraday for wrongfully inducing Morse to break his
contract--and against them both for civil conspiracy. The restrictions were reasonable ones reasonably necessary for the protection of Edison. It is enough for Edison
to prove that he has suffered some actual damages. He should not be deprived of his
rights because he cannot prove to the dollar the exact runount of his damage. See
198 Va.533 on p.lO of the June 1957 To ~_·t Supplement Cases of these Notes.

•
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2 :1~Gsie Adams and Tommy BaH were engaged to be ma~ried. Both Mr. Call~ an °:~.,
the Ball fam1~y, v1 ." •
frJ.. end of the Adams family ' and M.r o Dent, an old frJ.er1dBaJof
' ... ·"''(,.'.I
delighted with the engagerfl'ant,
but felt that as T0mmy -. ·1 wou ld b e r equued
·
·-··"·
tinue his schooling for the: next t:ew years some fu~ds should be paid t~e co~ _:-1.l ;,, 1.'.
their support,. Accordingly, on the day of the marn.age, and to the dellght c,f , ;:.18.

588 .
Mr. Call and Yrr. Dant entered in·:;o a wri t ·f~en c·:m tra::!t by the t erms cf
v:j.J. ch Mr o Dant agreed to pay Torruny the sum of $1500 <luring e3..::h of the snsceef1 in£;
f:mr years, and Mro Call agreed to m~ke sinilar payments to Susie. On the next rl.<:>.y,
a.nd b2fore any payment had been made, Mr. Call and Mr. Dent altered their vie·us c:..;.l
decided they whould not contribute to the support, of Susie and Tommy for fear ::. :rrL?;ht prevent their acquiring a feeling of self-reliance. Thereupon Mr. Call ar:.:;.
.fvtr,. Dent wrote at the foot of the contract:
11 This eontract mutually rescinded.
June 21 , 1963.
(s ) Charles C. Call
(s) Dan D. Dent 11
Susie and Tommy have @ust learned of this endorsement to rescind, and Tommy ask:·
you whether he may sue Mro Dent for breach of contract, and whether Susie may e.-,;;
Mr. Call for breach of contract.
How should you answer each of these questions?
(CONTRACTS ) These actions will lie. Susie and Tommy were donee beneficiaries of ·contract made for their benefit and are regarded as t h.i:! mms rs of vested right:"
since Call and DeYJ.t did not reserve a right to revoke. Unde:c V#)) .. 22 the benefi-:::arie s may sue in their own names. See also Restatement of Contracts #112 and
Illustration 2.
<IJr.l
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T ~'mmy,

3 1'6~ May 1, 1963 Irvin Dodd of the City of Pet.erebu!'g wrote and mailed the follo•r~
ing letter to Paul Pate, a bac he lor of the camP. Ci ty:
"May 1, 1963
"Dear Paul:
"You will recall our conversation of last Tuesday ~.·;ening in which
we discussed my buying ~rour r 8s idcn~e at 1001 E. Sycam0re Street. I have
decided to make the pur~ha ;.:; e and so I offer you ~~2 5 oOOO for the house
and lot, conveyance and se·;:, tlement to be mc.de within t!'lirty days.
"Unless I hear otherwi se from you on or bef ore May 15~~h, I shall
definitely consider the deal closed and the house and lot mine.
Sincerely,
( s) Irvin Dodd)l
On Hay 20th Pate telephoned Dodd and stated he accepted Dodd's offer. Dodd replied
he had on May 17th decided to withdraw the offer and had a greed to buy property
adjoining that of Pate. On June 15th Pate brought a st.:.it for specific performance
against Dodd in the Circuit Court of t hf": City of Petersbv.:-g.
Dodd now consults you, recites the fcregoing fa~t3, and inqu:i_rcs whether he may
effectively plead the Statute of Frauds in defense to the suit. What should you
advise him?
(CONTH.ACTS) Confining the anr.r.-mr to the questi on asked D::>r.l.d 0annot effectively plead
the Statute of Frauds for he has s ignE.Jd :-:. . mGmor<md um 0f the contract. The Statute
of Frauds is for the protection of t i10~e wh-:> h8. '.' 8 not sigr,erl. and not for those who
have. See 187 Va.lOl.

2 Ji>Jack Rousseau was a misanthropic old man who lived alone and liked it. Advancing
age made it increasingly difficult for him to care for himself and his small farm on
which he lived. He decided that it was necessary for him to obtain someone to live
in his home and care for him so he journeyed to the big city and visited a Salvation
Army kitchen. There he induced one of the workers Christine Pale, to leave her home
in the city and her job with the Salvation Army and go to Rousseau's farm to live.
He told her that, if she would live in his home and take care of him for the remainder of his life, he would leave a will devising his farm to her. Christine
accepted Rousseau's proposal and went to live in his hom~. For several years she
cooked for him, nursed him, and did the general housework. Upon Rousseau's death
Christine was startled to learn that, while Rousseau left a will and bequeathed to
her only $10, he devised his farm to a nephew whom he had not seen for fifteen years.
Christine consults you and asks your advice respecting her rights, if any, against
the nephew and against the estate of Romsseau.
What remedies, if .~ny, are available tb Chris tine?/
(CONTRACTS) (EQUITY) Christine has two possible remedies. She may sue at law on a
quantum meruit theory to prevent Rousseau's estate from being unjustly enriched at
her expense; or in this case she may successfully proceed in equity to have Nephew
declared a constructive trustee of the land. That portion of the statute of fl'.iildS
with respect to contracts not performable within a year had no application as
Rousseau might have died within a year. And an oral contract to devise or convey
land is taken out of the statute of frauds in equity where the terms of the contract
are certain, complainant's acts were the result of the contract, and complainant
has made such a change of position that failure to enforce the contract would work
a fraud on him. 188 Va.668.,
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3 P October 1, 1963, William Trapper called Simon Hidebound on the telephone and
offered to sell him 20 bundles of hides for the sum of $8,000. Hidebound stated
that he would inspect the hides the next day. l:Jhile Hidebound was inspecting the
hides on the next day, Trapper told him he would .give him S days from that day within which to advise him whether he would accept his offer to sell the hides for the
sum stated. Upon completing his inspection Hidebound stated that he would be in
touch with Trapper within the 5 day period ru1d let him know whether he would take
the hides. Four days later Hidebound went to the place of business of John Leatherstrap, saw the same 20 bundles of hides that were earlier exhibited to him by
.

bUbo

Trapper, and upon inquiring he was advised that Trapper had sold tnc:. hides to
Leathers trap the day pre-vious. Upon l e::rving Leathers trap r s place of business, and
on ~he same day, HideThound tendered a certified check, payable to the order of
Trapper, in the &mount of $8,000, and told Trapper that he was accepting his offer
to sell him the hides for that sum. Trapper refused to accept the check, advising
that he had the day before sold the hides to Leatherstrap. If the hides had been
sold and delivered to Hidebound he would have made a substantial profit on a resale.
Hidebound sued Trapper to recover damRges for breach of contracto May he recover?
(CONTRACTS) No., An offer w:i:thout, consideration may be withdrawn before acceptance
even if it was agreed that the offeree was to have a stated time in which to accept
it, if he so desired. After Hidebound learned from any reliable source that Trapper
no longer owned these hides, he knew that Trapper no longer wishes to sell to him
and hence that the offer had been revoked. He cannot accept an offer after it has,
to his knowledge~ been revoked. Restatement Contracts #42.
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i~&Srmand was the owner of a thriving restaurant business located on premises for
which he had a three-year assignable lease, but because of his age, he had decided
he should sell the business. He entered into a listing agreement dated June 1,1963,
with Russell, a real estate agent, whereby Russell had an exclusive listing for
f orty-five days for the sale of the business which included the name, goodltdll,
equipment, lease interest, etc., for $20,000 cash with the co1nmission to Hussell of
7% of the sale price. Russell conta.cted a number of people and finally obtained a
written offer from Vintner, dated July 1, 1963, to buy the business for $.5,000 cash
and balance in monthly paymen·hs secured by chattel mortage, the offer to be binding
on Vintner only if he could obtain an A. B. C. license and a five-year lease on the
premises, both of which had been applied for. This offer was rejected by Gormand as
~'~not being for $20,000, all cazh. 11
Th13reafter on July 7, 1963, another written
offer of Vintner's was submitted for $18,000, all cash, ru1d subject to obtaining
A. B. C. license and five .. ycat' lease. This was also rejected by Gonnand as "not
being for $20 1 000, all cash." On July 12, 1963, a third written offer of Vintner's
was submitted stating that he '1-JOuld buy the business for $20,000 cash subject only to
obtaining A. B. C. license a.nd five-year lease, and that he hoped to have the
license and lease lilthin a very short while. C~~mand Jnade no answer to this, and
when conta.cted, declined to sign a contract of sale but would not give any reason
for doing so.
·
On July 30,1963, Russell learned much to his distress that Gonnand had sold the
business on July 2? to Boyardee, a stranger to Hussellj for iP25,000. Hussell sued
Gormand for his commission, claiming that he had produced a buyer pursuant to the
listing agreement, that Gormand had never raised any objection to the provision
as to obtaining an A. B. c. license or lease when rejecting the t\>ro offers prior to
the last one, that he would gi7e no reason for not acc~pting the final $20 1 000 cash
offer, but that the ~plication was clear that the reason for refusal was that he
had a prospective buyer at a higher price. Gormand test.i.fied at the trial that in
his mind he did not want to tie up his business awaiting Vintner's obtaining the
license or lease, but admitted he had not stated th:Ls in regard to the first two
offers and did not give this or any other rea8on for rejecting the final offer.
Is Hussell entitled to recover in his action for a commission against Gormand?
(CONTRACTS) No. Russell did not find a purchaser on the t erms Gormand specified.
Nor was Gormand under any duty to give a reason for refusing to do what he was
under no duty to do. The conditions of an A B C license and a five year lease
(which the would be purchaser added)amounted to a counter-offer which Gormand was
free to reject. See 202 Va.575.
3~5~ Suburban wanted to leave the teeming city and buy a home in the suburbs. He
found a wooded area that was being developed i nto homesites and was shown various
sites by Stu Sellem, the agent of the owner-developer Tanglewood, Inc. Sellem
advised that an existing lake owned by Tangle Lake, Inc., an entirely separate
corporation, on which some of the sites fronted, was to be cleaned out and lowered
and sand beaches installed and that obiously these sites would be more desirable
than the non-\-Taterfront sites and ther efore would cost more. Sam Suburban had
always wanted to live on the water so he executed a written contract with Tanglewood, Inc., for the purchase of water front lot number 52, and for the construction
thereon of the dream house model home. The contract and deed pursuant thereto also
provided that the "9•ft lot 52 is to be completely sodded and with a forty foot sand
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bea~h installed by Tanglswood, Inc., it being further understood that the lake is to
be cleared out by Tangle Lake, Ina., up to lot 52 and the forty foot sand beach is
not ito be installed until the lake is cleaned out and lowered by Tangle Lake,Incon
Suburban moved in upon completion of the house but before the lake and beach worlc
had been done. After a year's time and after many protests, this work was still not
done.. Tanglewood, Inc., then advised Suburban that Tangle Lake, Inc., had given
Tanglewood, Inc., every reason to believe that it would clean out and lower the lru(e,
but to the surprise of Tanglewood, Inc., there 1-vas not an enforceable contract for
this and Tangle Lake, Inc., had now refused to do this work o Therefore., Tangle'l-mod,
Inc:., advised that it could not and v1as not obligated to install the beach because
the lake had not been lowered as contemplated by all parties to the contract and
deed.
Suburban brought an action against Tanglewood, Inc., for damages as represented by
the difference in value of his homes~ta with and without the clean lake and beach,
but Tanglewood, Inc., contended that Suburban was not entitled to any recovery because he did in fact have a water front lot and by his contract knew that the lake
and beach work depended upon Tangle Lake, Inc., doing certain work first.
Is 1'anglewood, Inc., liable to S~ Suburban?
(CONTRACTS) Yes. Defendant promised that Tangle Lake, Inc. would do certain things.
Defendant ran the risk of non-performance. Suburban paid defendant more for the
lot in reliance upon the promise and is entitled to recover damages from defendant
because of the resulting partial failure of consideration. See 201 Va.405 ..

\)~~tailer,

3 ..
of Roanoke, Virgi nia, O>ved Wholesaler, of Richmond, Virginia, $5,000
that was past due. vlhe:n \ATholer:a.ler demanded payment, Re tailer wrote him~ 11 I can • t
pay this nov1 and I doubt that. I car. . ever pay it because I am practically broke, but
i f you will take $2,500 and cancel the debt, I will try to get it for you."
Wholesaler, upon inquiry~ found tha t Retailer's finances wel~e in such bad condition
that he might lose the whole debt so he wrote Retail e r: "I accept your proposition,
send me $2,500 and I will call the acr: ount square.'1 Retailer paid the $2 9 500 but
received no receipt or ackno;.Tledgmen-t. of it.. About a year later, Retailer's affairs
took quite a turn fvr the better and Wholesaler <J.sks your advice as to whether
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he can nov< e ollect. the bc:?.lance of the debt.. How ougbt you to advise him?
{CONTRACTS) He cannot collect the debt. . V#ll-12 changes the common law rule that
F ':..:-·i:. performance of a pas t due liouidated ~laim can not be consideration for its
discharg~ . Th~s section rea.ds, "Part pe..rformance of an obligation, p~omise o:c
undert2.kJ.ng, e~ther before or after a breach thereof, when expressly accepted by
the creditor in satisfaction and rendered in pursuance of an agreement for that
PU!'PQSe, though without any new consideration shall extinguish such obliga'i:.ion,
promise or W1dertaking.tt The transaction was complete when the creditor aC'.cepted
the part payment as full payment pursuant to agreement, and no receipt or
additional notice was needed.
Note: The same result c--:1n be reached by resort to U.C.C.2-209(l) which reads, "An
agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no c onsideration to be
binding$"

7 P 4ibolesal er wrote Dealer: "I oi'fer you a carload of #l potatoes at 1~3o00 per
cwt ._, r.o.b ~ Richmond." Dealer wrote: nAccept offer only if price is for potatoes
f.o.bo Roanoke. 11
Wholesaler made no reply and Dealer several days later wrote: 11 I accept your
offer of potatoes at $3o00 per cwtQ, ..f.oob. Richmond.n
Potato es having advanced in price Dealer seeks your advice as to his rights, i f
any, against Wholesaler. Hew ought you to advise?
(CONTRP.CTS ) Dealers conditional acceptance amounted to a counter offer which terminated Dealer's prior power to accept the original offer. Hence I would advise
nGaler he had no rights agai nst Wholesaler.
Note: u.c.C.2~207 does no·(, change the result inthis case since Dealer's acce pt ...
ance was expressly made conditional on as sent to different tenns.
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2.t>~1anton

reco1.re:::·0d and docketed a judgntcnt CJ.gaii1st Carmen for $2,000. At that
time Carme n owned a lot worth ~~1 1 000 and. no other property. A few months later
Carmen sold hllis lot to Delman fo:c $900 ca:::h~ Bl<mton wrote D::. . lrnan that he intended
to subject. the lot. to the payment. of his judgrr1e nt; Delmun wro>.-e in reply: nrf you
will wait twel,re months to do this, :t: will pay the judgment ca Blanton Cl. g:..~eed to
delay proeeedings for this period and at ito expiratio~ der!l£.nded payment from
Delman, who refused to P·''-Y. Blan·::.on has no\-! brought an action against Delman on
his promise to pay the amou~t. of t.h~ judgment. Hay he recover?
(CONTRACTS) Yes.. Note 15 in 4 M.J., C0ntr.ac t s #36 reads j_n part, "Refraining from
instituting proceedings t.o subj ect land to th<'3 payment of a judgment which is a lien
thereon on a written promise by the owner of the land to pay the judgmant constitutes
a valuable con~id.:.ration for the prom~~e to pe.y ·che judg~ ·.:m t. .• although the land
owner was not prev-iously liable fo!' t.he jur2gma nt. Brad::ihaw v. Bratton 96 Va.S77,
32 S.E.56. 11 Since letters are ordinarily sj_gnf:"d I would assume that Delman had
signed the letter and her1ce that the Statute of ?rauds has been satisfied. But even
if he had not signed the letter his main purpose in making the promise was not to
help the principal debtor but to se ~:ure a property right for himself and hence
Delman's promise wa.s not t1!i t.hir. the Sta ~u t:;.

a)tt
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1963;~rJ'eaver

January 1,
c0ntraci:.ed wHh Bennett to sell to Bennett 800 bolts
of canvas of a specified quality and grade fo:r a. price of ~~4,000 with delivery by
January 20. On January 5, W8av-er fu:::·nished a sample of the ma'.-erial to Bennett and
advised that he could ship the 800 bolta within five days. On January 7t Weaver
received a letter from Bennet+. ad'lising that the sample did not conform to the
specifications and was unaccept.<:.ble and Weave!" should consider the order cancelled.
, On January 12, Weaver received a lett~rr f:com Bennett ad·•:isir.g that he, Bennett,
was mistaken and that the sample was acceptable, so WeaYE;T should ship the canvas
immediately.
After rece:tpt of this letter, Weav8:r was persu aded by BacLran to sell to Badran his
entire stock of this canvas, and this was done on J anuary 14~ Weaver then advised
Bennett that the camras could not be dalivered since Bennett hc-.d cancelled the
order. Ben.'1ett out~ined ~anvas f\·om another sou!"l.!e at an additional cost of $1,000
and, thereafter, brought an action against Weaver f or .~ 1,000 d~J-mages.
Is Weaver liable to Bennett?
(CONTnACTS) Yes, ltleaver is liable to Bennett . Bennett's conduct amounted to an
anticipatory repudiation. But he retr-acted this repudiation before We3.ver had
changc;d his position. The law allows s uch a retraction which retraction unde!" the
circumstances of this ca::.> e reinstated the Contract.
No·te: Same result under u.c.c.2 ... 61l(l) which reads, ••until the repudiating
party's next performance is due he can x·ctract his r epudiation unless the aggrieved
party haG since. the repudiation caneelled or ma teriall y ch.:m ged his posi tior. or
ctherwise indic ated that he considcrs the repudiation final."

}.w~ -

2~ Under an.oral co~tract Plaintiff aereed to furnish Defendant cuttings and grafts

from Plnintlff 1 s prlZ ed camellia bush to enable Defendant to grow and market plants
therefrom. In return Defendan t agreed to pay Plaintiff a specified commission on
each of such plants s old by Defendant. Defendant obtain ed from the Plaintiff
cuttings and grafts during the year in whi ch the c ont ract was made and additional
ones during the next two years. Dur ing the third year Defendant, who had paid
nothing, although he had s old pl ants from those cuttings and gr a fts, was requested
to pay Plaintiff the commission agreE·d upon and refused to do so.
In Plaintiff's action again3t him, D8l'endant deni.ed liability on the ground that
as the contract sued on was not to be per fonned within one year , it was not enforceable.
How should the court :rul e on t his defense?
(CONTRACTS) The defense is invalid for two r easons:(a ) The contract, when made
might possibly hav e been fully perfor med in one year , and hence is not within the
Statute of Frauds; (b) Since plaintiff has already pe rformed, defenda.nts promise to
pay for what has a lready been perfol"!ned is not lvi thin the Statute. See 193 Va.891.

2 Jnne Exam 1965.
b) L~~
J. Defendant, without any consideration tl ..erefor, gaYe Plaintiff a 30-day w!"i tter1
option, not under seal, to purchase Blackacre, the former ancestral horae of Pl.s.in..
tiff 's grandfather~ for $75.fOOO. Twenty- five days later Pl<dntiff wrote Defend:mt
that he ~~as exercising the option to take Bla·~ka.cre, tendered him the $7),000 and
r equested Defendant to execute and deliver a deed to him. Defendant has refused to
<.; :m vey tho property, although he still owns it. Is Defendant obligated to convey
.
the property?
(CONTRACTS) Yes" While defendant could have withdrawn his offer at any t ime before
acceptance(becau.se of lack of consideration or seal) the offer created a power in
plaintiff to accept at any time before its termination. Of course the offer cannot
be withdrawn a.f ter a binding contract has been consummated by an acceptance. See
Restatement of Contracts #34.
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3.D A~rbert vlo Buck and John So Cox signed a contract by bRe terms of which Buck

agreed to sell to Cox for ~P55,000 Bu.c:k's farm situated in Halifax County. Shortly
after the contract was made, Bur)k l earned that Cox was not the person t o whom he
had intended to sell his f arm, but that he had meant to sell to another having the
same name. Buck promptly brought a suit for rescission in the Circuit Court of
Halifax County. Buck's bill, ·which was duly Sl-JOrn to, alleged t hat the defendant
John S. Cox with vJhom the agreement was made wa s a resident of Marti nsville, was of
poor credit, and was r eputed to be of doubtful integrity, that he(Buck) had been
l ed to believe on the advice of his uncle, Robert Buck, that the John S. Cox with
whom he was dealing was a. wealthy resident of Danville and of excelJent reputation;
that he had lear ned his uncle ' s statement describing the JohnS. Cox of Danville
to be true; that he vrould never l1ave contracted to sell his farm to the defendant
had he known of his poor credit and bad reputati on; and that performance of the
agreement with the defendant would subject him t o a financ i al risk neither contemplated nor intended at the time the agreemen t was signed. The defendant demurred
to the bill. How should the court rule on the demurrer?

1\~0BTRACTS--EQUITY) The demurrer should b~ . ~ustained. Defendant Cox has done noth:'.t::c·
to mislead Buck. The m:l.:::take is on the part of Buck only and Cox is not r e on:unsib~tf: "
fo r the unilateral mistake. C.:ox's reasonable expectations should not be di;ap~;p~~nt.; ..
cd because of a mistake of a third party. Besides Buck dealt face to face with GoA
~nd intended to deal with the Cox he so dealt with.
D~~

I

On Nov8 30, 1965, Jacob Barr ~as a guest in the home of Stuart Cole. Toward the
end of an enjoyable evening, Cole showed Barr his collection of old firear·ms, and
Barr became much impressed with~ musket which was in excellent condition, and
which had been used by a member of the Continental Army during the Battle of
Yorktown. Barr asked Cole if he was willing to sell him the musket, and Cole
replied, "I am, but my offering price is $450." Bar.rthen asked Cole whether he
could be given some time to decide whether to make the purchase, and Cole replied
that Barr could have until Dec. 7th to accept the proposal. On Dec. 6th, Barr
telephoned Cole and said, 111\.fter thinking it over, I accept your offer and will ply
the price and pick up the musket this evening.tt To Barr ls surprise, Cole replied,
tti am sorry, but I sold the musket to Herb Smith last Saturday." Barr, having
found Cole's statement to be correct, now inquires of you whether he has a cause of
action against Cole for breach of contract. What should your advice be?
(CONTRACTS) I would advise that Barr had a cause of action for breach of contract ~
While Cole could have withdrawn his offer at any time before acceptance since he
received no consideration for his promise to keep the offer open, the withdrawal
is not effective until Barr is notified either by Cole, or Barr learns from an
apparently reliable sourcs that Cole no loneer intends to keep the of fer open.
Until that time Barr has a power to accept. In our case Barr accepted before he
learned that Cole no longer wished to sell to him.,

4.
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2 June 1966.
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l;r~ a writt en contract bearing date January 3, 1966, and signed by both parties,
William Burke agreed to sel l to John Ifamilton ten acres of land,strate-g:Jl~al~ ~· ·
located for development purposes . This contract included, upon the insistence of
Hamilton, this provision:
-- -"If this land cannot be rezoned by March 1, 1966, for us as a motel, this
contract is null and void. 11
On February 27th, it became apparent to both parties that rezoning could
not be effected by March lst, and each party signed an addendum to the
contract containing the following language:
11 It is agreed that the period of time f or eff ecting rezoning of the
property is extended to May 1, 1966. 11
On April 29th, the property had not been rezoned and it then became apparent that
a rezoning as contemplated by the parties could not be accomplished. On April 30th,
Burke received a letter from Hamilton stating:
nif the property cannot be rezoned, I have nevertheless decided to purchase
the property and I herewith send you my certified check for the purchase
price and request that a deed be delivered."
Burke promptly returned the check to Hamilton and advised that he would not convey
the property to him. Hamilton commenced a suit against Burke seeking specific
performance of the contract. Burke filed an answer by which he raised the
following defenses%
1. The extension of time for the performance of the contract was invalid
in that it was not supported by a consideration; and
2. The contract lacked mutuality of remedy and could not be enforced
specifically.
How should the Court rule with respect to these defenses?
(CONTRACTS--Specific Performance) Part 1. There was actual consideration on the part
of both parties for the extension of time and in any event the original consideration would carry over and be sufficient •
Part 2. The provision as to re-zoning was i .n cluded "upon the insistence of Hamilton"
--was solely for the benefit of the vendee and could be waived by him. Specific
performance should be granted. Major, · 196 Va. 526 at p. 530.

~~~au Stirrup,

~enty

an emancipated infant of
years, had been earning his living
at various race tracks as an exercise boy. He was anxious to own his own race hors e
and, believing that two-year old "Fast Pacett would prove to be a great money wilmar,
he offered to buy the horse from his owner, Jock Bookmaker, for the sum n'!: SJ,()(;() .,.
Before Bookmaker would sell the horse he inquired of Stirrup his true ag,;, o Stir·:·u}
assured him that he was twenty-two years of age, statir.g that he had bee~ ~~ine
his living by exercising horses since he became twenty~·one. Believing th;:;.t ~tiJ.'J."..lP
had correctly represented his age, Bookmaker sold and delivered the hors ~ t.o
Stirrup and received in payment $3 1 000 in cash. Ten d~.ys after purchasing the
horse Stirrup concluded that he had made a bad purchase and insisted that Book-11~ker
take the horse back and pay him the $3,000. Bookmaker refused the demand made by
Stirrup. Stirrup consults you and inquires whether he may compel Bookmaker to ~; :.ke
the horse back and pay him the amount of the purchase price. What would you adv::.:~·-~?
(PERSONS) The infant cannot rescind because the contract was executed and the il~~4t
would therefore have to go into a court of equity in which the court would not ~-·-~ ;: lU.
its aid for an inequitable purpose. The infant is estopped by his misrepresenta t :Lon.
Stallard, 131 Va. 316 •
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CQI\!TRACTS l)b {:;
2. Shultz, a salaried employee of Gadget Company, invented on his o-em time
a secret proceeD for manufacturing uidaets at a considerably reduced cost.
Shultz and Gadget Compar1y entered into a 'tl!'i ttcn aereement by uhich Shultz
agreed to give Gadc;ct Company exclusive usc of hiG invention for brentyfi ve years and not to make the same public during this period of time and
Gadget Company agreed to pay Shultz royalties semi-annually on all net
profits from sales, Tho agreement also provided that if there should be
a broach by either party. then the other party should give notice of the
broach and the party in error should have thirty days in uhich to comply,
and, :Ur there uas failure of compliance. the contract could be cancelled
by uritton notice by tho aggrieved party. Shultz continued to Hark for
Gadget Company at his salaried job uhich had nothing to do uith the
production of uidgots.

For three years. uidgcts uere manufactured and sold. but no accounting
uas given or royalties paid to Shultz, though he repeatedly requested
payment. At the end of three years, Shultz . uithout advicing Gadget
Company, published an article in a trade journal disclosing the secret
process for manufacturing uidgots, and Gadget Company thereafter gave
notice that tho agreement. uas terminated.
Shultz brought an action seeking damages in the amount of all profits
for the three-year period. Gadget Company filed a counterclaim seeking
damages because tne disclosure of the secret process alloucd its competitors
to encroach on its sales market of uidgets.
Assuming that Shultz could prove there uore
not profits realized from the sale of uidgets and
that Gadget Company could prove that it sustained
damages as a result of the disclosure. Hhat are the
rights, if any, of each party?
coth parties may recover. Tho rule that a party has no rie;ht of action
:or a br(:ach of contract crhoro ho himself has first bro :~c n it docs not
apply •rhcr c the broach ~~o cs only to a minor portion of the c?ntract. uhultz
hao a caur>c ol :.1ction .~or his r oyalti8G and. Oadp;ct Company HJ.ll have a
ca1Joc of :.1ctioi1 f or brec:ch o:f contract and da.macc.s , eac h of uhich can
b~ -liqtcid:.J.tod and separ ated f rom the other. ( 177 Va 362)

•

COJ-1T!i.ACTS

3.

Db (,

purchased a lot in tl~o City of Lynchbur:; , Vir~ inia, f rom Pe t ers
and contracted :rith ~e oton to construct a Louse thereon, Ste vens supplied
ce rtain materials for the hous e to 1"\.eston before comple tion of the house ,
and Reston abandoned the job and l e ft tho State . Immediately afte r !'t oston
left, :jtevonf3 approached Quin;r:; and demanded that he pay or execute a note
for :. .540, tho amount remainin'~ due on tho ma t o rial furniohod, or he ,
Steve ns, <:ould L'ilc a mechanic 1 s lion on tho property . A1 thouc;h Quigg
shm~od that he had made f ull payment to ~' : ston. Steve ns Has adamant in his
demand, and (}ui ::;c; a gr eed to make payment to Steve ns i f ho uould not f ile a
mechanic 1 s lien :mel he e xe cuted a non-noc;otiab} o nota to St evens f or $.540.
On the same day, Ouons confronted Quir::;~ ui. th the .fact that he , O;rons, had
obtained and dockete d a jud::}"llCnt f or :~450, a·,:ainst Pe t e rs s hortly boforc
Quig~ purchased the property from L
:>c tcrs and demanded that Quic::?:. pay or
execute a note ·~ or this amount or 0;-rc;ns c.rould subj ect the prope rty to
enforceme nt of tho lion, Qui~ r::; a gr eed to ma~ <O payment i f Oue ns Hould not
attempt to enforce tho judgme nt lien and executed a non-neGotiable not8 for
the .;,450.
The r ea f t e r, Qui ;:::::; had a chan·::;e o .!. heart and r o f us ed to pay the notes:
uher cupon, he uns s ued s eparately by St e ve ns and CJt..renc, .
\rJhat do l ens e , i f any, doc.s QuiG~ have to each of the t uo actiom;7

•

Qui r.;; ~

Qui c;~ has a defe nse of lac' - of cons id'; r a tion.
h mate rialman can hold
m;ner only to the: exte nt of th e: amount s till o~. ·od to t he: ::;ene ral contractor
at the.: ti.Jae he r eceives notice; or a mechanic' s lien. (1 8 2 Va C31). Stevons
abstainin:: : from 'ilin ::; a me chanic 1 c lien c'hic h ho had no l ec;al ri2;ht to
as sort, and crhich he could not r ca cona.bly believe! cave him a ri ght Fould
not serve a cons ider a t i.on. Qui c; ;~ has no defe nse a ~ains t Qnens . Tho l au
i s Hell r,ottled that ~orbcaranc <J , or the promi se of sam-:; , to p rosecute a
uell-f ounded or doubt.l.'ul clal.J·n i s a su J.' .:'icir; nt cons ide r a tion i.'or a contract.
Oue m;' _· orbcarance to e nforce tho jud;~emc; nt lien uould b e .suf.::'icicnt
consideration to s u 1)port r'ui n:r?; 1 c promi oo to p;:~.y t he ' 410 . .. i 99 Va 234.
2nd Dune 1967.
1. Jason had just completed a storebuilding in Roanoke when he was approached by
Klein to lease it to him. The parties discussed possible terms of the lease such as
the rental and how it should be paid, the duration of the lease, liability for
repairs and utilities, and finally Klein said: "We can agree on all those matters
later on and have our lawyers put them in the written lease." Jason said: tiAll
right't, and thereupon wrote the following, which was signed by both parties: "We
agree that Jason will leaae to Klein his new storebuilding upon terms to be agreed
upon and set out in a written lease. Witness our hands and seals."
Before anything further was done, Klein was offered a more desirable building at
a lower rental and wrote Jason that he would not proceed with the proposed rental
of his buildin~.
Has Jason any cause of action against Klein?
(CONTRACTS) No. To be enforcable, a contract to enter into a future contract must
specify all its materi~l and essential ~erms and leave none to be a greed upon as
the result of future negotiations. Where such a contract omits essential terms,
there can be no implication of the terms to which the pe.rties will finally agree.
If any essential term is left open for future consideration, there is no binding
contract, and an agreement to reach an agreement imposes no obligation on the
parties theretoo

2J(~

B, C, and D, owning a majority of the common stock of the Venue Corporation
and desiring to control its activities, executed the following document: "In consideration that each of us shall constitute Z as Trustee to vote our stock in the
Venus Corp ~ration, we do hereby irrevocably constitute the said Z as our trustee
for four years t.o vote our said stock ...
A became dissa tisfied and sought by appropriate proceedings to r evoke Z'a
authority to vote his stock. Over the objection of B, C and D, should he be
successful?
(CONTRACTS) He should not be successful. The promise of each of the parties was
consideration for the promise of the other. There was thus an enforcable contract
among the parties.

fY7•

2. John Smith deposited with Richard Jones $1,000 as security for Smith's performance
of a contract. Finding himself in desperate need for funds because of certain personal obligations, Smith assigned to Arthur Able for cash his right to the refund
of the deposit. Still needing funds, Smith thereafter also assigned the right to a
refund to Bob Baker. Bob Baker took the assignment for value in good faith without ."
any knowledge of the prior assignment, and immediately gave notice of the assignment
to Richard Jones. Subsequently, Arthur Able also gave notice to Richard Jones of the
assignment to him. Upon John Smith's performance of the contract, Richard Jones is
uncertain. as to whom he should pay the deposit and comes to you for advice.
How should you advise him?
(CONTRACTS*assignment) The deposit should be paid to Able. He who is first in point
of time is first in right, and hence mere priority of notice to the obligor of the
assignment does not give priority of right to a later assignee over an earlier
assignee of the same chose in action. 195 Va.85.
or
(alternative answer equally acceptable) Jones could absolve himself of any
liability simply by filing a plea of interpleader.

•

3)>~1 the summer of 1966, Buyer and Seller signed a paper not under seal by which
Seller agreed to manufacture and to sell to Buyer 400 tons of flour at a specified
price, and Buyer agreed to purchase the 400 tons and such other flour as he might
require during the spring of 1967, but Seller was given the right to cancel the
arrangement at any time. Buyer did not communicate further with Seller. Seller manufactured and bagged 400 tons of flour in April, 1967, and notified Buyer that the
flour was ready for shipment. Since, however, Buyer had not submitted an order to
Seller, the former refused to accept delivery. Seller brought an action in the
surrrner of 1967 in the Circuit Court of Frederick County, Va., against Buyer for
damages, and in his motion for judgment alleged the foregoing facts. Buyer demurred
to the motion for judgment on the ground that the parties had never entered into a
valid contract.
How should the Court rule on the demurrer?
(CONTRACTS) The demurrer should be sustained. An unsealed contract for the sale of
goods to be delivered in the future, signed by the proposed seller and buyer, but
which contain a reservation on the part of the seller of the right to cancel at any
time, is void for want of mutuality. Both parties must be bound or neither is. The
subsequent offer of the vendor ,to deliver the goods which he had never bound himself
tp sell cannot impose a liability on the vendee. 105 Va.8Al; 103 Va.l71.
4J>~~nry

Jones owned Blaokacre. He and his wife, Mary Jones, conveyed it in fee
simple to Hiram Smith for $50 8 000 cash. By the deed the Grantors covenanted that the
Grantee(l) should have quiet possession of the land (2) free from all encumbrances.
Two months after he had recorded his deed, Smith discovered that William Black had
secured a judgment the year before against Henry Jones and Mary Jones for ~10,000,
that the judgment had been duly docketed in the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Ceurt
of Buchanan County, Virginia (the county in which Blackacre was located) two months
before his purchase of Blackacre, and that the lien thereof had not been released.
Although Black has taken no action to enforce the judgment, Smith consults you as to
his rights against (a) Henry Jone s and (b) Mary Jones for breach of each of the
foregoing oovexmnts, telling you that he fears if he waits too long, the Joneete
may become ihsolvent. How ought you to advise him?
(PHOPEPl.TY CONTRACTS COVENANTS)(a)Smi th has no present right of action on the covenant
'
that
he should
have ' quiet possession of the land. There is, however, a present right
of action on the covenant that Blackacre is free from all encumbrances.
(b) Smith has no rights whatsoever against the wife. If a writing jointly signed by
a husband and his wife is a deed conveying the husband's land, no covenant or
warranty therein on behalf of the wife operates to bind her any further than to
convey her interests in the land, unless it is expressly stated that she enter into
\ such covenant or warranty for the purpose of binding herself personally.
1(55-41;55-52; Manual for Title Examiners p.l02)
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